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Abstract 
 
Political will at the national and multilateral scale is coalescing around the emerging discourse 
of Green Growth. The narratives and practices of Green Growth have already been rejected by 
many stakeholders as a reformulation of business as usual discourse. However, this article 
argues that this critique is grounded in a false conflation of distinct interpretations of the 
concept. In place of homogenising all associated narratives, we argue for an aspirational 
Critical Green Growth perspective, socially inclusive and conducive to structural 
transformation, incipiently identified in Asian national policies, particularly Korea. Drawing 
on this background, and other development insights, we conduct a ‘backasting’ exercise to 
identify trajectories leading to this imagined future of Green Growth. We address a key gap in 
the literature, the lack of dialogue between Green Growth and Developmental State studies. 
We then argue for the importance of the Green Growth State (GGS) in introducing fundamental 
change in this critical window of opportunity. Elements of this overarching concept would 
include broad characteristics of: a flexible and diverse policy mix; value-driven, multi-
stakeholder, multi-level governance; public trust and collaboration; and appropriate 
measurements of progress discouraging commodification of nature. 
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Highlights: (maximum 85 characters, including spaces, per bullet point) 
 Identifies the concept of Green Growth as garnering significant national and 
multilateral political interest.  
 Argues that distinct interpretations of Green Growth can be identified. 
 Highlights the characteristics of a ‘Critical Green Growth’ perspective. 
 Argues for the importance of a Green Growth State (GGS) in promoting a fundamental 
transformation in economics. 
 Outlines important characteristics of the GGS. 
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1. Introduction  
“The science is clear: the sponge that cushions and sustains us, our environment, is already 
saturated with carbon. If we don't limit global warming to two degrees or less we are 
doomed to a period of unprecedented instability, insecurity and loss of species…As 
responsible citizens of the world…we have a duty to persuade our leaders to lead us in a 
new direction” (Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town [1]). 
 
At their heart, Green Growth discourses transcend the curbing of economic growth as a means 
for responding to environmental limits. Green Growth interprets climate change not as a cost, 
but as an opportunity [2, 3] and advocates investment in the environment as a driver for 
“recoupling” environmental protection with growth accumulation [4]. For this reason, 
following its emergence in the West around 2005, Green Growth has gained considerable 
momentum in supranational organizations such as the World Bank and OECD after 2008 [5, 
6]. By 2012, the World Summit (RIO+20) linked the green economy with sustainable 
development and poverty reduction as priority themes for action, and the UN articulated strong 
support for Green Growth at the start of the conference. 
Despite this momentum however, the Rio+20 witnessed a considerable derailment of 
traction for the Green Growth. Civil society groups opposed the agenda, with one headline 
story in the World Summit newspaper Terraviva, boldly pronounced “Green Economy, The 
New Enemy” [7]. Moreover, the final official conference report, The Future We Want [8], 
contained only a cautious account, with Green Growth as one of a set of important tools 
available for achieving sustainable development.  
In response to what we identify as the non-inevitable stumbling of a potentially 
powerful paradigm of meaningful transition, the current paper undertakes fundamental 
reappraisal. We argue the reason for this and other detraction from the Green Growth agenda 
is conflation with other overlapping, yet distinct and discernible, public policy narratives – the 
Green Economy and also Green New Deal. Moreover, we identify that in the West, Green 
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Growth discourses have become colonised by underlying ideological structures, which utilise 
selected elements to further more longstanding agendas, such as the continued liberalisation of 
markets.  
As part of this argument we suggest that, while scholars should continue critical 
treatment of all green Growth discourses and practices, it is essential not to ‘throw the baby out 
with the bath water’. In order to illustrate this, we proposed that the more fundamental 
constructions of Green Growth as articulated in East Asian, and particularly South Korean 
which has made astonishing Green progress [2, 9], remain a radical policy alternative for 
Western transitions. We argue that while a critique of Korea’s application of Green Growth 
might find them wanting against some benchmarks [10], this does not undermine the relevance 
of original aspirations that contains potential to influence empirical outcomes from discourse 
formation. 
To advance what we term a more Critical Green Growth agenda, the paper 
fundamentally employs the technique of ‘backcasting’: first constructing a desirable, 
aspirational future and then critically exploring the conditions that might potentially precipitate 
it [11, 12]. In this way the approach is specifically developed to better embed normative 
aspirations in the distillation of transformative policy principles and direction [13, 14], and 
therefore escape confining contemporary discursive fields. Following this methodology, first 
we build a normative, aspirational definition of Green Growth that transcends current Western 
interpretations, designed to work as a policy vision or end goal to guide efforts of these 
coalitions for change. Second, we draw on empirical data and theory to outline an integrative 
critical perspective depicting conditions needed to achieve such vision.  
Overall, the Critical Green Growth perspective that emerges in the first half of the paper 
supports calls to move beyond the focus of quantitative growth and instead advocates for 
qualitative change. We support the reframing of economic progress through movement away 
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from: quantity to quality, the consumption of physical to non-physical outputs, and 
technological to wider socially embedded innovation (organisational innovation, social 
networks and R&D intensive specialisation) [15]. Practically we argue for the necessity to 
promote future economic activity not harmful to, and that can support, natural capital. This 
therefore incorporates quality-oriented, low-carbon, energy efficient growth, with a strong 
focus on creating value through new clean technology, as well as natural infrastructure and 
innovation in markets for environmental goods and services. However, we also advocate that 
existing environmentally problematic sectors of the economy must be proactively phased out. 
Here Critical Green Growth goes beyond the ‘business as usual’ perspective that economic 
expansion should be balanced with proactive efforts to maintain and develop environmental 
systems – and therefore, engages with central criticism of more mainstream interpretations, 
such as the Green New Deal [16]. As a result, the quality of Green Growth can be identified 
by the extent to which ‘green’ economic activity contributes to enhance and preserve natural 
capital.  
Grounding our ‘backcasting’ exercise in critical understanding, we build on empirical 
progress that has been made under the Green Growth agenda in East Asia an specifically South 
Korea [2, 17]. This work identifies a significantly stronger role for the state than has been 
currently considered in European or North American Green Economy perspectives; and 
underlies our support for the view that any significant transitional theory must be a theory of 
politics and the state [18]. The paper therefore addresses a key gap in the literature, the lack of 
dialogue between Green Growth and Developmental Capitalism State studies [19].   
As a result the paper makes unique contribution by proposing the concept of the Green 
Growth State (GGS) as a value-driven, multi-stakeholder governance framework to facilitate 
economic expansion from environmentally synergistic sectors; and proactively cure brown 
operations. Analysing evidence from East Asia, we contend that progress towards a Green 
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Growth future will require the institutionalization of deliberative democracy processes – and 
ecological values transcending national interest as overriding policy principle – in 
Developmental Capitalism models. In this way, we view our proposals as categorically 
different from a centralised Green Leviathan model.1 Stemming from this core we proposed 
further characteristics for transformation, namely: (1) a flexible and diverse policy mix, (2) 
value-driven, multi-stakeholder, multi-level governance, (3) public trust and collaboration, and 
(4) appropriate measurements of progress. 
 
2. Green Babies and Brown Bathwater: Deconstructing Green 
Growth discourse in the West 
 
The popularity of a new terminology arguably reflects a widespread intuition that something is 
changing in the structure of society [20]. The term ‘Green’ has long been associated with 
environmental activism [21] both grassroots (i.e. Greenpeace) and political (i.e. Green parties), 
thus signalling a public-private advocacy coalition for transformative social change. However, 
juxtaposing Green with ‘Growth’ or ‘Economy’, signals that society is recognised that 
ecological and economic problems are inextricable linked. Green Growth as a semiotic unit 
encapsulates this much more fundamentally and succinctly than sustainability, resilience, 
resource-efficient or “low carb” (which does not account for waste or exhaustion of resources). 
While we recognise that some interest groups might outright reject associations with ‘Green’, 
                                                 
1 The Green Leviathan perspective argues that centralized national-state level environmental policy produces 
more stringent regulation and delivers more effective environmental protection outcomes that devolution and 
decentralized policies. Using empirical evidence from US, Canada, Switzerland and EU, Weibut [20] 
demonstrates that when formal and informal cooperation between state or provincial government were tried, 
they proved less effective at environmental protection than national standards, He argues that, in particular, 
regulatory enforcement provisions must be centralised and not subject to negotiation in order to be effective. 
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the above logical coupled with the extent adoption of Green Growth well supports efforts to 
work with a normative built around the concept. 
Taking this forward, an examination of academic papers referring to the term Green 
Growth in a discussion of new economy discourses [19, 21, 22] identifies an inevitable variety 
of discourses; many of them, we argue, antithetical to its roots. More importantly, many 
interpretations of Green Growth reformulate underlying framings. As a result, subsequent 
critical engagement largely covers old ground with critique, as in the case of Rio+20 objections, 
stemming largely from underlying manipulations. For example, in many cases Green Growth 
is interpreted as free market environmentalism and used to continue advocacy for neoliberal 
policy and governance tools [23]. Here detractors respond with reference to growing inequality, 
market failures, focusing on the continuation of economic colonialism and resource extraction 
[19]. In other places, Green Growth is interpreted as narrow sustainability, with criticisms 
focused on a lack of attention to social inclusion [24]. In some cases, Green Growth provides 
a guise for weak sustainability or ecological modernization [21], and to advocate the 
monetization of natural capital, technological solutions and human ingenuity. Here criticisms 
identify failures to recognise the physical limits of Earth and customers’ responsibility; thus 
increasing reckless behaviour, weakening the precautionary principle and hindering political 
space for more radical transformation [25, 26]. Similarly critics of framing as low carb, 
resource-efficient or green developmental growth point out that these are all too prosaic 
approaches. They assume that only incremental changes are needed but fail to address the real 
extent of interconnections and complexity of relations between political, economic and 
ecological structures. When Green Growth is taken to mean Green Developmentalism its 
application is narrowly prescribed as a strategy useful only for natural resources rich countries 
in the initial stages of development [24]. 
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Based on this analysis, we are argue that while the critique of emerging Green Growth 
discourses is important, it is not analytically helpful to treat the emergent concept of Green 
Growth as a mere conduct to bring longstanding debates to the fore. Moreover, the rejection of 
certain interpretations does not detract from the value of more fundamental and critical 
meanings; and here we assert the importance of disseminating a more historicised 
interpretation, much more radical in its construction. 
For us, a dominant but largely overlooked feature of Green Growth is its non-Western, 
peripheral provenance. When endorsed by the 5th Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Development in Asia and the Pacific (MCED-5) the allure of the concept lied in the simplicity 
of its definition: inclusive growth that is created by expansion of green sectors and 
transformational greening of the economy. Greening was about reducing the carbon intensity 
of an economy that was less polluting and wasteful, but more resource-efficient. The main 
drive was “national interest” to address climate change and energy security while pursuing the 
competitive advantage of Asian multinationals by creating a new growth engine for the region 
(becoming a “World Green Power”) [27, 28]. Green Growth was also explicitly socially 
inclusive and should convey “a green revolution of improving the quality of life for all” [29]. 
For civil society, the term evoked ingrained cultural values of harmony with nature.  
Arguably, the widespread dissemination of the term had been only possible in the 
context of globalized world economy and the slow shift in geopolitical power from West/North 
to East South. However, being an “alien” concept to western approaches, its appropriation by 
western actors substituted Asian values for western blueprints, in what can be seen as a process 
of assimilation to dominant value systems (cultural colonialism). In such a process actors make 
sense of an alien concept by association with existing debates, superimposing their own biases 
and cultural judgements. In western contexts Growth has been long framed as an end on itself: 
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social and environmental aspects relegated in the assumption that eventually growth will spill-
over and markets will provide solutions.   
From these Western reconfigurations emerge concerns, such as those of Atkisson [24], 
about the exclusion of social issues from green growth saying that  Sustainability is  Green 
Growth + Welbeing. Moreover, that Green Growth is inferior to sustainable development since 
a   “A thing may be considered green (a super-efficient, low-emissions diesel car, for example) 
without meeting the real criteria for sustainability: fitting within the resource and ecosystem 
capacities of the planet (aka the ‘planetary boundaries’), while being universally accessible, 
theoretically, over time, to all people” [24]. However, such concerns arise from the 
reconfiguration of discourse in the transition from Asian to Western contexts. Growth in East 
Asia is not an end in itself, and has been much more closely associated with equity promoting 
mechanisms. The Asian Tigers achieved an unparalleled growth with simultaneous reduction 
of inequality and progressive democratization from 1960 to 1990. This was reflected in what 
East Asian countries termed the “principle of shared growth” [30]. South Korea assumes that 
endurable growth is inclusive; and the novelty of Green Growth in the Asian context is that 
now growth also needs to be green, reflecting human-nature harmony. The current narrative in 
Korea’s government reflects this clearly: Green Growth is the answer to three fundamental 
challenges: Energy Security, Social Inclusion and Environmental deterioration. Green Growth 
implies a process of transformation of the economy and industrial structure to make it more 
efficient, clean and de-coupled from exploitation of natural resources; and this is well 
illustrated by Koreas progress in reduced dependence on oil [31] carbon intensity [2] and 
improved energy efficiency [32]. 
 
Critical Green Growth: An aspirational interpretation 
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Many elements of the Korean critical perspective have been incorporated in “The 
Future We want”, leading Meadowcroft – one of the pioneers of strong sustainable 
development – to conclude that “There is a level of engagement with ideas of limits, and a 
concern with adapting the human economy to operate within ecological constraints, that in 
some ways extends beyond where these organizations have been before” [33]. However, there 
are also contradictions, inconsistencies, a reluctance to explore conflicts, and diverging 
currents affecting the coherence of critical Green Growth narrative; therefore threatening to 
make it misleading, evasive and constraining [34].  
Here we agree that Green Growth should include not only social inclusion and  
transformative intent (already contained in critical views), but also an explicit position with 
regards to changes in consumption patterns and lifestyle [26, 35], commodification of nature 
[36, 37], substitutability of types of capital and  co-existence of green and  brown  economies. 
Our position is that natural and cultural capital cannot be replaced or duplicated by man-made 
capital. There is an intrinsic value in nature that cannot be measured in economic terms because 
it is independent of human needs. Although unmeasurable, the richness and diversity of life 
forms contribute to sustain human civilization and values in ways we still not fully understand 
[33]. Moreover, ecological losses are frequently irreversible and the impact of its loss in human 
life hard to assess ex-ante [38] Commodification on nature increases the risks of making the 
wrong decisions about nature. Rather than protecting nature by giving it a price, nature should 
be protected by reinforcing values of moral duty and affectedness reinforcing the uniqueness 
and intrinsic value of life supporting systems and the moral duty to live in harmony with nature. 
Although Green Economies have long included a consideration of environmental issues 
[39] the main drivers for Green Growth are not only ecological but also economic, social and 
technical. Green Growth is proposed as a post-financial remedy to reinvigorate the ailing global 
economy, refocusing it towards being more socially inclusive through investment in markets 
11 
 
for environmental goods and services, and the development of natural infrastructure, and 
capital, such as forests, water bodies and bio-diversity [40]. In this respect, Green Growth 
breaks from the Kyoto process which signalled restraint in the growth agenda and instead 
emphasises business opportunities, enterprise and job creation [41]. For example, South 
Africa’s Working for Water Program, which has created 25,000 new jobs for the unemployed 
in the removal of invasive plant species that consume high levels of water, and the Kibera 
Community Youth Program in Nairobi, which involves unemployed youths in the assembly of 
small and affordable solar panels [42]. 
Green Growth is not meant to be an extension of the Ecological Modernization 
discourse [43, 44], whose technical-economic focus aims only at improving environmental 
efficiency to maximize profit while minimizing environmental costs [45]. Instead game-
changing, Critical Green Growth must be fundamentally rooted in economic approaches 
allowing for the inherent complexity of human-environment relationships. Critical Green 
Growth is to be fuelled by policies and managerial techniques promoting synergies – rather 
than just decoupling – environment and traditional business2. To achieve this aspirational 
vision is not enough having a expanding green sector, but also pro-actively phasing out 
traditional “brown economy” and chaging consumption patterns and lifestyle.  Green Growth 
is a combination of growth in “green , smart sectors” and degrowth in “brown, inefficient 
sectors” [15]. The idea of creative destruction in which new forms and ideas drive out the old 
is central to this process [48].  
Reflecting how accumulation of growth translates into Green Growth principles, 
suggest that Critical Green Growth discourse should shift concentration away from the quantity 
of growth, towards a quality of growth amalgamated from consumption of physical and non-
                                                 
2 For fuller discussions of the relationship between Green Growth and previous sustainability paradigms see 
Glemarec and Puppim de Oliveira [46] and Vazquez-Brust and Sarkis  [47]. 
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physical outputs (i.e. services and experiences), and from the production of environmentally 
harmful goods and services to those that are environmentally enhancing [49]. Moreover, 
‘environmental industries’ are to include technological sectors which combine low-input, low 
entropy and low waste characteristics.  Green Growth accepts the assumption that a 
fundamental transition away from Green House Gas (GHG) intensive energy sources is a 
matter of urgency. Policy makers must move beyond consideration of the physical availability 
of carbon based fuel sources. Instead, the true concern must be the decline in “the capacity of 
air, water, soil, and biota to absorb, with intolerable consequences for human wellbeing, the 
effects of energy extraction, transportation and use” in addition to the political stability to 
maintain the current status quo [50].   
Consolidation of  Growth systems  should relate to interventions aimed to  make sure 
that although Green Growth adds value(s) to the economy, it does so in order to identify 
virtuous cycles, consolidating networks necessary for a circular economy, coordinating global 
learning curves for green technology and a market for resources with emphasis on recirculation 
rather than wasteful linear throughput [51], while seriously considering the need to invest in 
measures that prevent a major spike in energy prices, and thus significantly endanger national, 
regional and global economic activity.  
Allocation of Growth must be carefully monitored by governments. Critical Green 
Growth discourse also expects economies to be socially innovative in providing the basis for 
socially just and inclusive growth. Thus, there must be behavioural transitions to slow 
anthropogenic causes of climate change and trigger both high-skill intensive employment – 
R&D in clean energy technologies - and low-skill intensive employment - for instance in forest 
planting, and organic agriculture. Inclusive growth is not only a long-term objective. It is also 
argued that green public and private spending is a better and more inclusive than “brown” 
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spending, when seeking to reactivate economies in a recession3. Many environmental measures 
related to construction and resource management activities, such as making buildings more 
energy-efficient, are not only labour intensive but also location-specific and not practical 
candidates for off-shoring [52]. As the discussions in the next section highlight, social justice 
considerations must be maintained at both the national and transnational scale as fundamental 
part of the Critical Green Growth approach.  
However, despite the identification of an aspirational discourse of Green Growth, the 
underlying question becomes how to manage the process to ensure that ‘creative destruction’ 
results in Green Growth? The metaphors is a garden where valuable plants must be nurtured 
but  weeds  extirped. But, who is the gardener in this metaphor? 
 
3. Who will be the Gardener? The imperative of the ‘Green Growth State’  
 
To better understand how the aspirational vision of Green Growth can be achieved in a 
timeline that accounts for the urgency of climate change challenges, we draw on the World 
Banks’s functional approach to understanding rapid growthb (FAURG)4. FAURG links rapid 
growth to the attainment of three functions of growth: accumulation, efficient allocation and 
rapid technological catch up. The current interconectednes of the global economy calls for a 
                                                 
3 This view is often called “Green Keynesiasm” [16]. In a recession governments must compensate loss of private 
consumption with public spending. Green stimulus offers competitive advantages over traditional sectors’ 
spending: resource efficiency  liberates resources for firms and customers to spend elsewhere,  pollution control 
and climate change action has spill-over health , amenities  and catastrophe-prevention effects;  advancing 
investment due for the future by  replacing ageing infrastructure with green infrastructure (i.e. transmission lines) 
has larger stimulatory effect and better cost-benefit results in the present than in the future, since it  benefits from 
cheaper resources available in a recession [52]. 
4 The approach was developed by a World Bank team led by MacDonald including Nobel-prize winner Joseph 
Stiglitz [30]. The objective was to find a theoretical basis for the unprecedented growth with decrease of inequality 
achieved by 8 high performing Asian Economies from 1960-1990. 
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further attribute of growth, particularly relevant to achieve green objectives: the consolidation 
of growth systems across national boundaries (i.e global supply chains, alliances, etc).  
The neoclasical views argues that markets perform the allocation function more 
efficiently than agents. However, FAUG observes that markets have consistently failed to 
allocate resources appropiately in earlier stages of developments when economies transition 
from agrarian to industrial. Building on this, we aregue that as coordination needs characterise 
early stages of any socio-technical transition, markets will be ineficcient in the intial stage of 
transitions from “brown “ to “green”; and even more when the nature of environmental 
challenges represents a global collective action problem where coordinated actions and agreed 
principles are needed across a range of actors  [53]. Studies on innovation and societal change 
show that uncoordinated initiatives are not the way “to get the ball rolling and to ‘learn by 
doing’ [54] and global markests underinvest in the formation of economic and technological 
networks that increase innovation and productivity. [36]. R&D and new network creation, such 
as distributed energy systems, requires state driven innovation and network creation with 
positive effects on economic growth in general [55].  
In the East Asian miracle, the solution to coordination failures was government 
intervention to go beyong market based competition  and emphasise cooperative behaviour 
among private firms (and among firms and givernment) and clear, performance-based 
standards of success. The key feature then, was evaluation of results, with the government 
distributing resources on the basis of performance, which the government and companies 
jointly monitor. Moreover, the recent emergence of Green Growth policy discourses has been 
matched with public investment, for example through recent stimulus packages in countries 
such as South Korea and Malaysia, in green sectors. [56, 57]. This is of course contrasted with 
alternaitve approaches in other countries, where a diluted Green agenda has seen less signifcant 
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green investment and indeed a relaxation of environmental regulation, for example in China 
[58, 59], where anlaysis rightly finds shortfalls in the greenign fo the economy [60]. 
Although mass behavioural change is best facilitated through market price setting, the 
potential of environmental limits cannot be downplayed, for which maintaining welfare will be 
considerably more costly to the global economy if these limits are pushed [61]. For this reason, 
there is a need to work within existing state structures but to bolster the state’s involvement in 
setting the parameters on private freedoms as coordinated by market governance and 
incentivize and coordinate the achievement of social cohesion through Green Growth policy. 
In order to do this, the state must 1) adopt the explicit objective to direct socially just qualitative 
development through the facilitation of Green Growth; and 2) continue to enfranchise those in 
both current and future generations affected by environmental degradation (discussed below). 
These two factors together will facilitate the transformation of the state from the Liberal 
Democratic to “a post-liberal, rather than anti-liberal” [62], ‘Green Growth State’ (GGS). 
The importance of situating Green Growth in the very DNA of the nation state is not 
just grounded in logical or ideological ideals. Firstly, successful initiatives that achieve good 
results can be stopped by changes in governments and the interests affected by these changes 
[46]. Thus, it is necessary to institutionalize anthropocentric, intergenerational commitments 
of social justice, as mediated by environment stewardship, at the constitutional level – as has 
been undertaken by the national administration of Wales in the United Kingdom [63]. Late 
developers who have achieved most in terms of qualitative development can be defined 
‘Developmental Capitalism States’ [64-66], who have development and social cohesion, not 
economic growth, as their primary goals.  For example, the Asian Tiger Economies (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) have embodied significant state directed growth but 
also achieved equitable distribution and other positive indicators of human development [67, 
68].  
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Environmental commitments must extend through government institutions into 
regional strategies and especially individual cities, which have a multitude of policy tools to 
embed Green Growth thinking [69]5. While the translation from policy to action cannot be 
assumed, depth and density of concrete commitment is an essential starting point for Green 
Growth transition.  For example, these commitments are evident in the case of European green 
energy, where clear political aims have been instrumental in driving markets, technology or 
civic mobilization [70]. Overall, GGS should intentionally foster a situation of “embedded 
autonomy” – and return to this topic later in the paper.  Now the four major elements of GGS 
are presented and include: flexible policy mix; value-driven multi-stakeholder, multilevel 
governance; public-private collaboration; and measurement of progress. 
 
3.1. Flexible Policy Mix 
Governance frameworks capable of facilitating desired development trajectories are a 
fundamental issues. Bold governments stimulate private spending by creating certainty about 
future green markets using a mix of policies, such as pricing, regulation and institutional reform 
[71]. The economic achievements of developmentally successful countries have been based on 
pragmatic approaches to governance, emphasising the importance of reflexive and dynamic 
systems. Historically, European and North American nation states adopted a central role in 
guiding market activity, well before liberalisation further promoted market governed 
efficiencies [72]. More recent examples of high growth (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil) are 
also characterised by strong levels of state intervention before liberalisation is undertaken [73]. 
The current state’s role in rewarding finance on the basis of performance is an integral means 
                                                 
5 Such as a) greener public services and purchasing behaviour, b) eco-efficiency of industrial production, c) 
consumer awareness and demand incentives, as well as d) support for research and innovative applications of 
green technologies. 
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to promote compliance of private firms in advancing the competitiveness of domestic industries 
[74, 75]. Drawing on comparative capitalism analysis [76], it is argued that stronger levels of 
government intervention to compensate market mechanism imperfections, give more 
opportunity for rapid “greened”. Thus, transition to Critical Green Growth is likely to be easier 
under models of social-market capitalism and developmental capitalism, where key attention 
is paid to ‘industrial policy’ [77, 78] and a great degree of social accountability of business and 
ideological emphasis on values other than economic efficiency. The progress made by Korea 
and Malaysia in the development and implementation of their Green Growth, or Green 
Industrial policies can be seen as early evidence in support of this point [2].  
Given this situation, GGS must apply an appropriately sequenced, flexible and diverse 
policy mix, drawing on both price and non-price policy tools in order to appropriately structure 
both demand and supply [79]. Policy must intervene in market operations 1) to sharpen 
incentives for the fulfilment of their Critical Green Growth agenda; 2) synchronise the 
disincentives to products and processes that undermine long-term living and production 
conditions [80],  and 3) steer the more sustainable trajectories of innovation in situations of 
technological bifurcation when there is a market stand-off between alternative technological 
trajectories [81]. 
For universal issues, market governance offers low transaction costs given its ability to 
coordinate millions of individual actors in both daily and less frequent activities. Unstructured 
markets facilitate actions that degrade ecosystems, because as they are unable to sustainably 
manage open-access resources such as the communal atmosphere. Therefore markets require 
scaffolding and structuring institutions, and the GGS must take a fundamental role in 
establishing these frameworks [46]. For example, price policy tools encompass a variety of 
economic instruments such as environmentally-related taxes, fees, charges and the elimination 
of environmentally harmful subsidies [47].  Within this context, GGSs should consider 
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facilitating the development of a generic carbon tax and/or emission trading scheme in order 
to send a clear market signal to incentivise a wholesale transition from high to low carbon 
intensive economic activity and technology [40, 82]. Disincentivising environmental damaging 
activities alone is likely to hurt economic growth, to counteract these constraining policies, 
positive price incentives to compensate for this in other areas is recommended [41]. 
As a specific case, renewable energy has become a major field of green 
entrepreneurship [41] and in the European Union has been stimulated by targets for  renewable 
electricity to make up 21% of supply by 2010 (Directive 2001/77/EC). In response, EU 
Member States introduced a variety of policies and support schemes, in the case of Germany 
and Denmark moving policy out of traditional silos and resulting in industry development and 
job creation [83]. Broadly, green energy technologies can be seen as highly disruptive 
technologies in that they reconfigure socio-technical systems by allowing both large and small 
consumers to become involved in production, and where bottom-up growth builds a more 
balanced multi-level system [84]. 
A reflexive and flexible approach is further supported because GGS must also take 
action on removing environmentally damaging economic activities. Non-price policy tools 
including: command-and-control regulations; voluntary approaches based on negotiated 
agreements between the government and specific industrial sectors to address particular 
environmental challenges; and government stimulus for green technology innovation (training, 
network formation and research) can all be utilized.  The latter tool is exemplified by the 
following: Korea used 79% of economic stimulus for its green economy;  the EU 59% and 
China 38%, and the US allocated 12% [85].  Note that only Korea’s case can be considered 
aligned with Critical Green Growth.  All the other countries invested more in sustaining their 
brown industries than in promoting green ones.  
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At the level of policy specific requirements, a key issue will be prioritising investment 
in appropriate education and training in, for example, how universities contribute to a labour 
force with multi-functional and high competencies for innovation within a Green Growth 
economy [86].  
In order to establish appropriate non-price interventions, it will require information 
about: what threshold should be applied to define low-carbon; what resources are non-
renewable; what is ‘non-sustainable intensity’; as well as the application of life-cycle analysis 
to understand true net effects of any interventions.  In Japan, for example, although nuclear 
production was initially part of the ‘New National Energy Strategy’, the Fukushima disaster 
(March 2011) was interpreted by some to rule out nuclear activities. More broadly the role of 
nuclear energy in the delivery of Green Growth has been strongly questioned [87].  A further 
point is that regulations might also be necessary to complement stimulus packages to 
environmentally enhancing economic sectors [88]. Providing incentive structures necessary to 
support entrepreneurs and improve competitiveness is one policy avenue [89].  
Another significant policy instrument is the restructuring of public procurement 
guidelines to consider environmental issues.  This possibility has been adopted in Korea [2] 
and in the European Union [90]. Naturally, blanket regulation will be controversial and a 
localised approach taken into account local conditions is more appropriate. For example, while 
strong regulation might be attractive, over-assertive policy measures taken too early may lead 
to blockage, as vested interests in the carbon economy resist loss of status quo [41]. In many 
cases then, softer and less confrontational policies with triggering effects may have a better 
chance of success [70].  
In today’s globalised economy, no single nation can achieve Green Growth goals with 
policy contained entirely within the country’s borders: although, different approach may need 
to be taken in different states given contrasting internal characteristics. The republic of  Korea, 
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as a case in point, is helping Mongolia and Vietnam, find and implement their own green 
growth strategies, tailored to their specific needs and conditions [24]. While the European 
Union, for example, in the area of green energy policy, shows that in place of prescribing one 
universal set of policy tools across member states, the details of the GGS are better worked out 
within national contexts. Success depends on the respective framework conditions in the 
individual Member State and the specific style policy instruments used [91]. Empirical 
evidence collected in EU-15 states by Damonte [92] support the effectiveness of tailoring 
elements of a wide policy mix to each country’s idiosyncrasies.  Countries will therefore need 
to find the right policy-mix for their local context while meeting the needs of international 
markets. Such a policy mix, should also identify and support the best green technology 
platforms to leverage comparative endowment advantages and foster international 
competitiveness in selected environmental goods and services. Results can be obtained using 
different tools provided that evaluation is used to keep tools harnessed to this policy goal [92, 
93]. 
 
3.2. Value-driven Multi-Stakeholder, Multi-Level Governance  
The ultimate ability of liberal democratic governments to resolve, rather than manage 
ecological problems has been strongly questioned [62 see Chapter 4]. Therefore, in order to 
escape derailment by economic (neo)liberals the GGSs must expand national and international 
institutions of participatory governance through which policy debate can be directed. This need 
is also supported by the limitations of the Korean example. Here government failure or 
unwillingness to involve local actors and communities is found to result in a lack of wider 
pressure on companies, who have more recently retracted support for Green Growth given 
declining profit motivations [19, 28]. 
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There is an overwhelming need for increasingly participatory spaces for debate despite 
the required strength of the GGS.  This need for further participatory debate is due to the need 
to foster domestic societal trust and participation, and overcome a lack of international 
governance. Transformation requires evolution not revolution, the further enfranchisement of 
stakeholders affected by environmental damage must be a key feature of the GGS. Political 
participation is in itself a desirable development aspiration [94], and that reflexive policy can 
only emerge through stakeholder participation – a characteristic that also builds the important 
element of trust and collaboration which is further elaborated below.  
Currently, the liberal democratic state only provides formal and not substantive 
freedom for citizens to operationalise their own concept of the ‘good life’. This provision will 
require two interconnected changes.  The first is the adoption of Critical Green Growth as the 
central mission of state operation. The second is the development of participatory processes 
beyond only those currently holding power and to further encompass wider communities of the 
environmentally affected and their representatives. The GGS needs to integrate the principle 
of common ecological embeddedness and affectedness to include those greatly affected by 
Green Growth policy decisions. This will necessarily include an expansion of participatory 
institutions at both the intra- and inter-generational scale. In agreement with many philosophers 
of green politics, the rule of law and principles of democratic oversights must therefore not 
only remain, but find themselves strengthened through post-liberal reform. 
This argument draws on the position of as Habermas [95] who highlights the 
importance of structuring collective identity, not around the common culture of the nation state, 
but around shared democratic procedures. However, a pragmatic approach also recognises that 
institutional development must accept the existing role of institutions comprising the nation-
state: and we agree with Dryzek [43]that the best bargain is likely to emerge from the 
reconciliation of state interests and defining movements. In this respect the construction of the 
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GGS should deepen deliberative democracy while avoiding the trap of conflating this with 
positive environmental outcomes [96]. Deliberative democracy includes the use of dialogue 
and reasoned argumentation to foster mutual understanding, delivering collective decision-
making through the best possible genuine democratic decisions, reflecting the diversity of 
interests and minimising the interference of political power, money or strategising [43].  The 
practical realisation of this theoretical underpinning is an increased density of multi-level and 
multi-dimensional governance, which includes vertically different levels of government and 
horizontally across networks across sectors, regions and stakeholders [41]. Furthermore, this 
process of institution building must take place both below and above existing national 
governments. It is for this reason that many see the development of meta-governance as an 
important mechanism for sustainability issues [97]. In terms of innovation, this approach 
challenges the assumption that the poor are too poor to eco-innovate. It also argues that multi-
level governance should promote grassroots eco-innovation as an avenue for inclusive Green 
Growth exploiting local potential, traditional knowledge and international connections [98, 
99]. These differing levels are discussed in the next two subsections.  
3.2.1. Sub-National Governments 
In complement to our proposal to embed Green Growth as the principle mission of government, 
some suggest a charter of citizens’ environmental rights and responsibilities be appended to 
existing civil and political rights [62]. For example, in contrast to popular perceptions, China 
has made substantial progress on granting and enforcing the public right to environmental 
information [100]. Given the importance of international cooperation on these issues, 
multilateral agreements could be developed to encourage states to offer similar rights. This 
cooperation is exemplified by the Aarhus Convention (2001) that grants access to information, 
public participation and justice, in governmental decision-making concerned with the local, 
national and transboundary environment. The role of local authorities is already well 
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recognised by national signatories of UN’s promotion of the Agenda 21 initiative, although 
further work in making them accessible to communities and their representatives would be 
essential. One practical suggestion is that representatives of environmental NGOs could be 
given more direct access to decision making processes at this lower levels of national 
government [62].  
Aside from state initiatives, both informal and formalized networks and coalitions have 
been established between cities and regions, such as ‘‘Cities for Climate Protection’’, ‘‘Climate 
Alliance’’, and the C-40 ‘‘Large Cities Climate Leadership Group’’. One area of particular 
interest is sub-national networks for the planning of more environmentally benign food 
systems, particular geared around the issue of nutritionally and quality based urban food 
security [101]. 
Alongside, regional governance, alternative institutions to open up access to state power 
include community-right-to-know, community environmental monitoring and reporting, third 
party litigation rights, environmental and technological impact assessment, statutory policy 
advisor committees, citizens juries, consensus conferences, and public environmental  inquiries 
[62]. 
3.2.2. National Governments and Above 
In many cases national or regional economies have become greener by simply exporting 
negative environmental activities to other regions of the world, often with less capacity for 
regulation or alternative operation, therefore greatly hindering global Green Growth.  This has 
been defined as the pollution haven hypothesis.  In this context, national regulations are 
increasingly impotent for regulating cross-border supply chains [102] [103]..  
Although case studies, in which one region is found to impart negative environmental 
impact on others [104, 105] are criticised as failing to account for the system as a whole – as 
in the case of global forest destruction [106] – coordinated efforts are still needed to keep 
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positive developments on-track and precipitate change where global balance is less certain – 
for example in the area of fish stocks [107] or ground water [108]. In response to this need, the 
development of international multilateral agreements between states offers one well tested 
means of creating “over-lapping, supplementary structures of rule that actively utilise existing 
territorial governance structures” [62].  
The necessity of state lead national and supranational coordination is grounded in three 
arguments [54]. First, transitions from fossil fuels to renewable-energy sources need 
organizational innovation and transformation requiring several decades, speeding up the 
process needs international focus and coordination.  Second, international coordination is 
necessary to develop Global Learning curves for creating energy-efficient and renewable-
energy technologies. Third, international coordination will be necessary to overcome the 
resistance to change in incumbent production and consumption systems,  
The experience of the European Union provides important lessons into the possibilities 
of building supranational governance institutions.  Particular examples include the significant 
achievements in environmental policy through the involvement of a variety of state and non-
state actors at different levels of governance, ranging from the local to the global [109]. These 
state backed institutions are an important future development given the limited life span and 
impact of ad-hoc agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol [89].. 
Beyond these developments radical proposals for new forms of global governance, 
including global parliaments, an interconnected global legal and court system, an international 
military and guaranteed basic income have been recommended [110]. Many see the United 
Nations as a natural starting point for the reform of global governance [111].  
However, radical multilateral agreements are likely to be hampered by “trust deficits”.  
These trust deficits include the lack of trust between countries created by historical patterns of 
confrontation or exploitation. Trust deficits are rooted in the principle of belonging and require 
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time and continued effort to build bridges and connectivity. Therefore, a reflexive component 
makes it possible to transnationalise democracy in adaptive, incremental, experimental, 
consensual, and domain-relative ways [62].  These projects would entail adding, qualifying, 
and supplementing the principle of ‘belonging’, with the principle of ‘affectedness’ [62].  
Innovative suggestions scattered throughout the literature on green governance might prove of 
interest. For example, Thompson [112] proposes non-citizen Tribunes where representatives 
of ordinary foreign citizens and international organisations can participate in decision making 
as a means to open up the conventional international discussions between states. Other ways 
of developing governance frameworks that transcend the boundaries of nation state 
jurisdictions might be deliberative forums for discussion, reciprocal bilateral representation in 
decision making processes and cross-border referenda. 
Participatory governance at any level offers entrenched interests the opportunity to resist 
change. For example, “reforms to remove subsidies on agricultural inputs and fossil fuels are 
not only frequently opposed by multinational oil companies as eating into their profits but also 
by the poor who rely on the subsidies for their basic needs” [46]. In this sense, the GGS must 
ensure appropriate sequencing of policy that interacts with actor’s capability to accept and 
complete difficult transitions; with important differentiation between concessions for 
stakeholders fundamental and more peripheral to the continuation of problematic trajectories. 
 
3.2.3. Public-Private Collaboration  
Not only does a Green Growth future require dynamic interaction of competition-based 
incentives, but also collaboration and cooperation by networks of private firms and public 
institutions [113]. Although the illustrative examples of East Asian development and Green 
Growth have initially employed very strong state interventions (although the extent of this 
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intervention in some areas has been reduced over time [114]), ideological emphasis placed 
great priority on ‘social cohesion’ as a main objective of economic development [115].  
These issues bring into question the conclusion that Green Growth is similar to other 
policy reforms advocating the acceptance of short-term investment costs in the expectation of 
long-term gains [116]. In Korea for example, the development of the Green Growth agenda has 
been underpinned by a continuation of a strong government direction, but an overt concern for 
social cohesion and distributive justice, which is evidenced by the universal energy service for 
the poor under which government has been made responsible for eradicating energy poverty 
by 2016 [103].. 
One of the key characteristics of the successful development state model was the 
“embedded autonomy” observed between the state and wider society [117]. According to this 
analysis, successful developmental capitalism states require “corporate coherence” – among 
state officials in their commitment to the goals of the state – and connectedness to groups in 
civil society – including both developmental elites and community/neighbourhood 
representatives. This approach recognises the importance of “interdependent networks” in both 
facilitating and impeding the greening process [118]. Just as an entirely green culture might 
not be necessary to for green reforms within a particular firm, the key to wider transition is 
more likely to be appropriate interdependent networks of individuals in key positions. The 
Korean GGS, exemplifies this situation, where the Presidential Committee on Green Growth 
(PCGG) was drawn from governmental ministries and the private sector [2, 103].Indeed, 
Evans, who developed this characterisation of Asian governance initially focused on industrial 
development [117], his later work increasingly considered “sustainability” [119]. While it 
might be assumed that private interest will feed into government processes, with strong state 
commitment, it is also expected that the reverse will be true. In this way, networks embedded 
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with eco-centric “sense-making” resources can offer beneficial spill-overs into other networks 
and organisations [120]. 
However, pubic private collaboration needs to be balanced with wider societal 
embedding to avoid capture of the state by business interests. This need is illustrated by more 
recent gridlock in the traction of the Korean Green Growth agenda. After initial support, private 
companies later moved to oppose the speed of economic greening; refusing to invest in 
renewables, opposing the introduction of ETS and the compulsory use of the Governments 
Mandatory Environmental Management System [28]. Wider public involvement and 
governance would help offset this to some extent we argue. 
 
3.3. Measurement of Progress 
Without integrated indicators for environmental and economic policies, economic 
transformation will remain rhetorical [121]. “If we have the wrong metrics, we will strive for 
the wrong things [122]. Uni-dimensional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) metric leads 
decision-makers to sacrifice natural resources and ecological environment to achieve economic 
development [122]. However, it is also true that decades of efforts to adjust the primary metrics 
of developmental evaluation [123] have made little impact on the way that the mainstream 
economy reports ‘success’.  
Despite this inertia, reform in the light of new normative values emerging within the 
Green Growth paradigm is necessary, as it is important that we measure what we care about 
[124]. For this reason it is suggested that Critical Green Growth has the potential to overcome 
the current impasse. Previous efforts to rethink quantitative evaluation have gained little 
traction as they have focused on discounting GDP, or offered only vague measurements and 
use of indicators [125]. Alternatively, Green GDP would assign more weight to 
environmentally enhancing goods - those products and services that preserve and develop 
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natural capital – and account for future effects of current investment trends [See for example: 
126]. Other complimentary indicators might also be useful, such as  Greenhouse gas emissions 
per unit of value added (GEVA) for example [127]. 
In addition to a reformed system of national accounting, individual businesses and 
organisations will also need to reform their matrix of evaluation and other descriptive 
indicators. The UNDP [128] suggests focusing development on the areas of economic 
transformation, resource efficiency and progress and well-being. If such measurement is to be 
operationalised however, international forums will have to agree on standards and disclosure 
of environmental information along global supply chains. It will also be important to recognise 
that measuring green transition requires an appropriate timeframe: as although President Park 
has placed reform of Korea’s energy policies and industrial infrastructure as a top priorities, 
outcomes are only likely to emerge in the medium to long term future [31]. Whatever the 
indicators taken to benchmark progress, ideally ecological evaluations will become as normal 
as conventional economic terms presently used in decisions [129]. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, this article has highlighted the emerging policy discourses and practices associated 
with the term Green Growth, and argued for the importance of maintaining the more 
critical/radical interpretations. Most fundamentally, we argue that for such a radical approach 
to emerge, the Green Growth State (GGS) will be required to manage a convergence between 
the western liberal and Development State models to situate Green Growth as the central aim 
of multilevel governance arrangements. 
Summarising the existing discourse Critical Green Growth needs to move beyond eco-
centric perspectives of previous sustainability paradigms that call for a contraction or steadying 
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of economic activity. However, the critical interpretation also avoids ecologically weaker 
perspectives of the Green Economy. Although it advocates the addition of value(s) through 
expanding green activities – and therefore places the emphasis on the qualitative quality of 
growth as opposed to simply the quantitative element – it also seeks to proactively curb 
environmentally damaging economic activities. The strong economic focus of Green Growth 
seeks to establish virtuous cycles as expansion in green sectors creates other opportunities in 
the economy, principle of which are green sector jobs for the population. To maintain the 
anthropocentric nature of the sustainability agenda, Critical Green Growth also maintains a 
focus on social justice to promote more equal forms of development in the current and future 
generations. 
In order to help precipitate this desired outcome, it has been suggested that the state 
take Green Growth as its defining objective, from which can stem a flexible and 
heterogeneous policy mix to achieve this. While the appropriate model for the governance to 
structure any activity is always controversial, we have drawn on our view that the most 
paradigmatic successful examples of developmental transition have been centrally precipitated 
by the nation state. Initially, this has involved more direct and dense intervention, although as 
the private sector has been structured in ways compatible with state objectives, sequenced 
liberalisation is considered to be the most effective way to drive change: especially given the 
need for entrepreneurship we view as the best way to promote growth in green areas of the 
economy. This will require that state support is sectoral in its targeting and makes the deliberate 
effort to promote domestic competition to ensure efficiency concerns are not lost in the political 
structuring of economic activity. 
A further principle requirement of the GGS will be that  “given the way that existing 
unequal power relations tend to thwart fulsome policy debate and risk evaluation, it is 
necessary…to develop strategies of empowerment for systematically excluded groups to 
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achieve more inclusive social deliberation” [62]. For this reason, we have proposed that multi-
level, value-driven multi-stakeholder governance will be required to provide government 
institutions with the inclusive perspective needed to advance sustainable economic activity. 
This requirement is true at the level of participation below the state system, but also above in 
the international arena—as despite our concern to work from existing realities, there is clearly 
a need to build on these to prevent environmental negatives into the spaces between current 
governance arrangements. 
A further necessary characteristic of the GGS is that it should actively promote trust 
and collaboration with wider society. Here the notion of “embedded autonomy” is useful in 
conceptualising an appropriate relationship, with high degrees of interaction between the state 
and key societal stakeholders. More broadly, it must be accepted that even where the state acts 
strongly, there must be resonance between its actions and the interests of wider society. For 
this reason, appropriate relations with key stakeholders and organisations help to construct 
interdependent networks that share the values and objective which underpin the Green Growth 
approach. 
A fundamental focus on social justice operationalised in careful sequencing of 
transition, redistribution and support for stakeholder affected negatively in adjustment 
processes is also paramount. Finally, the state must ensure that appropriate tools for the 
measurement and evaluation of progress towards the Green Growth transition are established. 
While this is likely to require a reconsideration of GDP as the primary means of assessing 
national welfare potentials, other indicators must compliment this in key areas such as the 
growth of green infrastructure and direct welfare of the population. 
Green growth needs to evolve as a concept to be adopted, as the discourse has shown. 
We have provided some necessary adaptations and requirements for the success of this new 
innovative social policy tool.  There is a need to consider the integration of GGS and Critical 
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Green Growth for true synergistic economic and environmental growth where both goals can 
and should be achieved simultaneously.  We have shown ways to do this and in many cases 
examples exist, integrative thought, strategy, and adoption is needed for socially and 
environmentally beneficial outcomes to occur globally. 
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